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When a voluntary action is causally linked with a sensory outcome, the action and its
consequent effect are perceived as being closer together in time. This effect is called
intentional binding. Although many experiments were conducted on this phenomenon,
the underlying neural mechanisms are not well understood. While intentional binding
is specific to voluntary action, we presumed that preconscious brain activity (the
readiness potential, RP), which occurs before an action is made, might play an important
role in this binding effect. In this study, the brain dynamics were recorded with
electroencephalography (EEG) and analyzed in single-trials in order to estimate whether
intentional binding is correlated with the early neural processes. Moreover, we were
interested in different behavioral performance between meditators and non-meditators
since meditators are expected to be able to keep attention more consistently on a task.
Thus, we performed the intentional binding paradigm with 20 mindfulness meditators and
compared them to matched controls. Although, we did not observe a group effect on
either behavioral data or EEG recordings, we found that self-initiated movements following
ongoing negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs) result in a stronger binding
effect compared to positive potentials, especially regarding the perceived time of the
consequent effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence that the early neural activity
within the range of SCPs affects perceived time of a sensory outcome that is caused by
intentional action.
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INTRODUCTION
The link between a voluntary action and its consequent effect
leads to the experience of controlling one’s own actions, i.e.,
the sense of agency. For over a decade there has been a
growing interest in understanding a specific effect related to
human agency, which was reported by Haggard et al. (2002)
and termed “intentional binding”. They showed that when a
voluntary action causes a sensory outcome, the action and the
consequent effect are perceived as being closer together in time
than they really are. Action-binding (the temporal attraction
of action towards its consequent effect) and effect-binding (the
temporal attraction of the effect towards action) were measured
separately in order to investigate the intentional binding effects
(see Figure 1).
The intentional binding paradigm was applied in a number
of experiments to study human agency, such as self-causation
(Dogge et al., 2012), action selection (Barlas and Obhi, 2013),
shared actions (Strother et al., 2010), uncertainty of the effect
(Wolpe et al., 2013), emotional states (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013),
affective valence (Takahata et al., 2012) and beliefs in free will
(Aarts and van den Bos, 2011). Although many studies have
assessed how intentional binding is modulated, the underlying
neural mechanisms remain relatively unexplored (Moore and
Obhi, 2012). Recently, a study investigated the contribution of
specific brain areas on intentional binding (Moore et al., 2010).
A transient disturbance of the activity in the pre-supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA) by transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) reduced the temporal linkage between action and the
effect. This was mainly due to the fact that the sensory conse-
quence was perceived as less shifted in time towards action. In
contrast, the disruption of the contralateral sensorimotor area
had no or much less influence on the temporal binding effect.
These results suggested that the pre-SMA plays a crucial part in
intentional binding, especially on effect-binding. Because the pre-
SMA is seen as a key structure involved in conscious intention
to act (Fried et al., 1991; Lau et al., 2004) and intentional bind-
ing is specifically related to intentional action (Haggard et al.,
2002), this brain area is likely to be associated with the binding
effects.
The intentional binding experiment starts with a self-
generated action. This is similar to the Libet-type experiment
which assesses preconscious brain activation (readiness potential,
RP), preceding a voluntary action (Libet et al., 1983). In the
literature, the RP can be divided into two components based
on the scalp distribution and the slope of negative potential
(Shibasaki and Hallet, 2006). The early RP starts about 2 s before
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FIGURE 1 | Intentional binding paradigm. (A) In each task, participants
reported either finger movement time or the onset time of the tone,
indicated by the question marks. In operant tasks, i.e., Operant-M and
Operant-T, a voluntary finger movement causes the tone effect 250 ms
after. (B) Action-binding represents the temporal attraction of finger
movement time towards the tone onset in operant-M relative to
baseline-M, while effect-binding represents the temporal attraction of the
tone onset time towards the onset of finger movement in operant-T relative
to baseline-T.
a voluntary movement and consists of a prolonged and increasing
negativity. This activity is localized in the bilateral pre-SMA. In
contrast, the late RP has a steeper slope seen in the contralateral
premotor cortex starting around −0.5 s before movement onset.
Since the pre-SMA activity plays a crucial role in intentional
binding (David et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2010), one can presume
that the early RP might also be of importance for the temporal
binding effect.
Many studies have implicated that the onset of the RP is a
neural signature indicating initiation or preparation of a move-
ment (for review, see Shibasaki and Hallet, 2006; Haggard, 2008),
but recent studies suggested that the early RP is not necessarily
causally related to movement preparation (Schurger et al., 2012;
Jo et al., 2013, 2014). These studies rather suggest that a transient
negativity of the continuously fluctuating slow cortical potentials
(SCPs) facilitates the initiation of a movement in the near future.
Only by averaging many single trials of this kind the early readi-
ness potential emerges. These findings suggest that the emergence
of conscious intention to act may differ in each trial as a result of
differences in spontaneous brain states. Therefore, it may be more
fruitful to investigate the temporal binding effect and the related
brain dynamic on the level of single trials.
A number of studies have shown the positive effects of med-
itation on attention control and self-regulation (e.g., Jha et al.,
2007; Tang et al., 2007; MacLean et al., 2010; an overview is
provided in Wittmann and Schmidt, 2014). Thus, we were further
interested in the effects of experience in contemplative practices
on temporal attraction in an intentional binding paradigm. We
hypothesized that experienced meditators would display a differ-
ent temporal attraction as they are better in continuously keeping
the focus of attention on the specific task conditions (Chan and
Woollacott, 2007; Lutz et al., 2009; MacLean et al., 2010). Less
temporal attraction in intentional binding would be indicative
of less deviation from the timing of the actual event. Moreover,
growing evidence of positive effects on neural systems involved
in attention processes have been shown after meditation practice
(Slagter et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2012). Thus,
different behavioral performance on intentional binding between
meditators and non-meditators would be of interest regarding the
question of the underlying neural mechanism of the temporal
binding effect.
The aim of the present study is to investigate (i) whether the
early neural activity preceding the voluntary action has an effect
on intentional binding; and (ii) to explore its effect in experienced
meditators by examining whether these brain correlates would
be displayed differently as related to behavioral performance. In
order to do so, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG) activ-
ity, while participants engaged in the intentional binding task,
comparing a group of experienced meditators with matched non-
meditating controls. Behavioral and electrophysiological data
were analyzed on the basis of single trials.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty experienced mindfulness meditators (seven males; mean
age 40.7 years, SD = 7.5, range 28–50 years) volunteered for the
present study. They had at least 3 years of continuous experience
in regular mindfulness meditation practice and had continuous
meditation practice for at least 2 h per week during the last
8 weeks. Twenty matched controls in gender, age (mean age
40.3 years, SD = 7.4; p = 0.278) and education level, were
recruited. Control subjects had never attended any course of med-
itation practice including Yoga, Tai-Chi and similar techniques.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
had no known psychological or neurological deficits. Participants
were paid 10 e per hour for taking part in the experiment.
The ethics committee of the University Medical Center Freiburg
approved this study and written informed consent was obtained
from all participants. Participants were invited to come twice
within a period of 2 weeks to two different laboratories; first for
the assessment of meditation experience cognitive performance,
time perception, and personality, which will be reported else-
where, and secondly for the Libet-type tasks with EEG recording
(see below the apparatus and procedure).
SELF-REPORT MEASURES
The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Walach et al., 2006)
was administered to assess the level of self-reported mindfulness.
It has a two-dimensional structure with the factor “presence”
referring to the ability to attend to the present moment and the
factor “acceptance” referring to a non-judgmental attitude (Kohls
et al., 2009). A 14-item short version has been developed which
was used here.
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
The experiment followed the procedure introduced by Haggard
et al. (2002) as shown in Figure 1. Participants sat in front of a
monitor and performed two baseline condition tasks (baseline-M
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and baseline-T) and two operant condition tasks (operant-M and
operant-T) in a pseudo-random sequence. They were asked to
report either the first moment of their finger movement (m-time)
or the onset time of the tone (t-time). Each task contained forty
trials.
In baseline-M, an analog clock (visual angle, 3◦ in diameter)
was presented in the center of the screen. A clock-hand appeared
after a short period (of 1–2 s delay) and started rotating clock-
wise with a revolution period of 2550 ms. Participants were
asked to perform a voluntary movement (pressing the left mouse
button) whenever they wanted to, but not earlier than after
one full rotation of the clock-hand. After the button press, the
clock-hand continued rotating for a short interval (between 1–
2 s) and disappeared. Participants were then asked to indicate
with the mouse pointer the clock-hand position on the clock
circle at the moment when they started to move their finger
to press the button. The operant-M condition was identical to
the baseline-M condition apart from the fact that a 500 Hz
tone (presented for 100 ms) followed the button press after a
delay of 250 ms. The operant-T condition was identical to the
operant-M condition, but participants were asked to indicate
the onset time of the tone instead of the movement onset.
In the baseline-T condition, participants performed no volun-
tary button press. Instead, a tone occurred at random times
between 2.6 and 7.7 s after the clock-hand started rotating.
After the tone, the clock-hand continued rotating for a short
interval (between 1 and 2 s) and then disappeared. Participants
were then asked to indicate the clock-hand position of the tone
onset.
Because of EEG recordings (see below) participants were asked
to focus on the center of the clock and to refrain from eye
blinking during clock-hand rotation. Presentation of the clock
and collection of the response data were performed by the E-
Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, USA). Before the
experiment started, participants performed two blocks of a Libet-
type task, which will be reported elsewhere, and then performed
a few trials of practice for each task condition.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS
EEG was recorded from a Quickamp amplifier using 64-channel
active electrodes (Brain Products, Germany) in an acoustically
and electromagnetically attenuated chamber. Ground electrode
was placed on the forehead and an initial reference was placed
at P9 according to the 10–20 system. Electrode impedance of all
electrodes was kept under 5 k. One channel electrooculography
(EOG) was recorded to detect ocular artifacts. To estimate the
onset of finger movement, a single axis accelerometer (1.7 g) was
placed on the left mouse button to measure the exact onset time
of the movement. All electrophysiological data were recorded at a
sampling rate of 1000 Hz.
Pre-processing of data was performed with the help of
EEGLAB version 12.02 (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). EEG records
were down sampled to 250 Hz and re-referenced to linked mas-
toids. A band-pass filter from 0.01 to 45 Hz (zero-phase filter with
−6 dB cutoff) was applied. Continuous EEG data was segmented
into event-locked epochs ranging from 2.5 s before the event,
either the onset of the button press or the tone, to 1 s after
the event with baseline correction of the first 200 ms. Epochs
affected by artifact (±100 µV) of any electrodes except ocular
movement were excluded for further analysis. Remaining ocular
artifacts were then corrected using independent component anal-
ysis (ICA). The trials with a button press during the first rotation
of the clock-hand were also excluded. On average, 92.7% (SD =
8.6) epochs were analyzed.
Event-related EEG was measured as average over the nine
electrodes around Cz (FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz,
CP2). The amplitude of the RP was then quantified calculating
the mean signal during the period from −0.2 to 0 s before
this button press (or before the tone onset for baseline-T task).
Next, the RP was divided into an early and a late component
(see Figure 2). We calculated separate slopes for the each part
of the RP. The late RP slope was computed by dividing the
amplitude difference between the mean from −0.7 to −0.5 s
and the mean from −0.2 to 0 s by 0.5 s. Thereby we have
divided the estimated increase of the amplitude during the last
0.5 s by its duration. For the early RP we did the analogous
calculation. Since the amplitude is by definition 0 for the first
200 ms due to baseline correction the overall increase was esti-
mated by the mean amplitude from −1.0 to −0.8 s and then
divided by 1.5 s, which is the duration of the early RP. In order
to account for the slope of the early RP already contained in
the late RP we finally subtracted the slope of the early RP from
the late RP. By this procedure we can see whether there is an
additional increase in the late RP compared to already ongoing
trend.
To test whether ongoing potential shifts have different effects
on temporal attraction, the slope of each epoch was estimated by
fitting a first-order polynomial function to the average of nine
electrodes before the events. According to either a negative or
positive slope, each epoch was classified into either a negative or
positive epoch, respectively, and then averaged for each subject.
DATA ANALYSIS
Analysis of medians rather than of simple means was applied
in the present study as recommended for the Libet-type exper-
iment (Pockett and Miller, 2007). The m-time and t-time were
subtracted from the actual movement and the tone onset times,
respectively. Action-binding was calculated by subtracting m-time
during baseline-M from operant-M, and effect-binding was cal-
culated by subtracting t-time during baseline-T from operant-T.
Overall-binding is computed by subtracting effect-binding from
action-binding. The reported times (i.e., m-time or t-time) and
RP amplitudes were subject to a repeated measure ANOVA with
type of reported time (m-time vs. t-time) and agency condition
(baseline vs. operant) as within-subject variables, and the group
(meditators vs. controls) as between-subject variables. Compar-
isons for matched pairs between groups were performed with
paired t-test.
RESULTS
One control subject dropped out because of personal reasons.
Therefore, comparison between groups was performed with 19
matched-pairs. Meditators on average had meditation experience
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FIGURE 2 | Grand averaged event-related EEGs for meditators
(gray traces) and controls (black traces), during intentional
binding tasks. Solid vertical lines represent the onset of the finger
movement, while dashed vertical lines indicate the tone onset. The
division for the early RP and the late RP are represented by
both-sided arrows.
of 10.1 years (SD = 6.4) and in the last 8 weeks had on average
meditated for 7.6 h (SD = 5.2) a week.
SELF-REPORTED DATA
Scores of the self-report mindfulness scale revealed significant
differences between the two groups (meditators, 44.4 ± 1.1;
controls, 36.5 ± 1.2; t(19) = 4.991, p < 0.001), indicative of
higher “acceptance” (meditators, 24.8± 0.8; controls, 20.1± 0.7;
t(19) = 4.670, p < 0.001) and “presence” (meditators, 19.6 ± 0.4;
controls, 16.4 ± 0.6; t(19) = 4.382, p < 0.001) in meditators.
This result shows that meditators report themselves to be more
mindful than controls.
BEHAVIORAL DATA: REPORTED TIMES
A repeated measure ANOVA analysis revealed a significant inter-
action between reported time (m-time vs. t-time) and agency
condition, F(1,37) = 14.961, p < 0.001. To clarify this interaction,
we examined the temporal binding effects for reported times,
see Table 1. The reported time of the tone was shifted towards
action in comparison to the baseline condition (t(39) = −5.293,
p < 0.001), showing effect-binding in 81.1% of the partici-
pants. In contrast, we found no significant difference in m-time
between baseline-M and operant-M (t(39) = 0.336, p = 0.739;
action-binding being seen in 48.7% of the participants). That is,
Table 1 | Means of reported times and temporal binding effects during
intentional binding tasks.
Meditators Controls p-value All participants
m-time baseline −68.35(41.9) −7.16(24.0) 0.198 −38.54(24.6)
operant −66.30(25.4) −18.34(28.5) 0.248 −42.94(19.2)
Action-binding 2.05(26.8) −11.18(8.6) 0.639 −4.40(14.2)
t-time baseline −32.88(11.3) −32.40(18.8) 0.796 −32.64(11.7)
operant −131.58(27.6) −122.82(28.1) 0.856 −127.31(19.4)
Effect-binding −98.70(27.4) −90.42(23.5) 0.774 −94.67(17.9)
Overall-binding 100.75(39.1) 79.24(24.1) 0.614 90.27(23.0)
The m-time and t-time are obtained by subtracting the actual event time from
reported time in ms (SE). Action-binding and effect-binding indicate the mean
shifts in time from baseline to operant tasks for m-time and t-time, respectively.
Overall-binding is the difference between effect-binding and action-binding. p-
values were calculated based on 19 matched-paired between groups.
overall-binding was driven mainly by enhanced shift of t-time
towards action in the operant-T task.
Notably, we found neither significant group effect nor group
by task interactions (ANOVA analysis, all p > 0.193). Although on
average we observed an earlier m-time in meditators than controls
in both baseline-M and operant-M (see Table 1), further analysis
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of reported-times for all the tasks showed no difference between
groups (two-tailed paired t-test, all p > 0.198).
We also conducted a one-way repeated measure ANOVA on
mean waiting-time (the time from the start of a trial to the
button press) with the self-generated movement tasks (baseline-
M, operant-M, and operant-T) as a within-subject factors and
group (meditators vs. controls) as between-subject variables. It
revealed no task effect (F(2,74) = 0.465, p = 0.630) and no
group by task interaction (F(2,74) = 2.260, p = 0.111). The
mean waiting-times across participants were 7.21 s for baseline-
M, 6.98 s for operant-M, 7.06 s for operant-T, and 5.06 s for
baseline-T.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGIOCAL DATA: EVENT-RELATED EEG
Figure 2 shows the grand averaged event-related EEG for the
different tasks. A repeated measure ANOVA analysis on the RP
amplitudes revealed a significant interaction between the reported
time and the agency condition, F(1,37) = 37.149, p < 0.001.
To further test this interaction, RP amplitudes were examined
for reported times (i.e., m-time and t-time). While compari-
son between baseline-M and operant-M revealed no differences
(baseline-M, −6.40 µV ± 0.81; operant-M, −5.66 µV ± 0.73;
t(39) =−1.448, p = 0.156), operant-T showed higher amplitude as
compared to baseline-T (baseline-T, −1.37 µV ± 0.49; operant-
T, −7.19 µV ± 0.75; t(39) = −7.330, p < 0.001), indicating
absence of the RP in baseline-T. However, we found neither
significant group effect nor group by task interactions (ANOVA
analysis, all p > 0.260), displaying no difference for each task
(two-tailed paired t-test, all p > 0.371). Since we found no
difference between groups in both behavioral data and EEG
recordings, we pooled all participants for further comparisons of
the tasks.
We next examined the relation of reported times to RP com-
ponents, i.e., whether the early neural activity before the action
influences the temporal attraction. A significant correlation was
found in the operant-T condition, namely that the more negative
the early RP, the larger the shift of t-time towards action (r(32) =
0.403, p = 0.022; seven participants, including three meditators,
who showed no effect-binding were excluded), However, we did
not find this correlation in the late RP (r(32) = −0.173, p = 0.345;
see Figure 3). Notably, no significant correlations in the other
three tasks were found regarding both the early and the late RPs
(all p> 0.215), indicating the specificity of results for the operant-
T condition. This result suggests that the perceived time of the
consequent effect is related to the neural processes of the early RP,
but not with the late RP.
To further test this implication, each single trial of the indi-
vidual participants was classified regarding having a negative or
positive slope of the epochs, and then averaged (Figure 4). In
agreement with the previous study (Jo et al., 2013), we found
a significant correlation of the ratio of positive epochs with the
early RP slope (baseline-M, r(39) = 0.590, p < 0.001; operant-M,
r(39) = 0.644, p < 0.001; operant-T, r(39) = 0.802, p < 0.001; see
Figure 5), demonstrating that smaller portions of positive epochs
are related to larger negative early RP. However, we observed no
correlation with the late RP (baseline-M, r(39) = 0.272, p = 0.094;
operant-M, r(39) = 0.224, p = 0.171; operant-T, r(39) = 0.051,
FIGURE 3 | The relation of the RP slopes to reported time of the tone
during the operant-T task.
FIGURE 4 | Grand averaged ongoing negative potential (black trace)
and positive potential (gray trace) during the operant-T task. Solid
vertical line represents the onset of the finger movement, while dashed
vertical line indicates the tone onset. The shift of perceived time of the tone
towards action was increased in ongoing negativity (p = 0.023; see the
text). The grand mean of the proportion of positive epochs is 30.91% ± 2.0,
which results in prolonged ongoing negativity in the early RP (see
Figure 5).
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FIGURE 5 | The relation of the proportion of ongoing positive epochs to the RP slopes during the operant-T task.
p = 0.758). That is, the ongoing potential shifts are specifically
related to the early part of the RP. We then performed paired
t-tests to compare reported times between ongoing negative
and positive slope epochs, and found a significant difference in
the operant-T condition (negative, −131.8 ms ± 19.2; positive,
−117.8 ms ± 19.2; t(39) = 2.370, p = 0.023). The shift of t-time
towards action was larger in negative slope epochs as compared
to positive ones. This supports the relation that more negative
amplitudes result in stronger effect-binding. Importantly, how-
ever, we did not find the difference in the other three tasks
(baseline-M, t(39) = 0.079, p = 0.937; operant-M, t(39) = −0.510,
p = 0.613; baseline-T, t(39) = −0.681, p = 0.500), indicating
that neither the reported time of action nor the effect that is
isolated with intentional action was different between negative
slope epochs and positive ones. Taken together, these results
provide evidence that the early neural activity affects the per-
ceived time of a sensory outcome that is caused by intentional
action.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we aimed to investigate (i) the RP corre-
lates of the intentional binding effect; and (ii) to explore these
correlates in experienced meditators compared to non-meditating
controls. The latter comparison did not yield any significant
effect, neither in the behavioral data nor in the neurophysiological
ones. On the other hand, we found that the early neural activity
correlates with reported time across all participants. This finding
adds to the current discussion on the underlying neural mecha-
nisms of the sense of agency.
It is of interest that we could replicate only effect-binding
but not action-binding, the latter having been shown in sev-
eral other studies (Dogge et al., 2012; Barlas and Obhi, 2013;
Wolpe et al., 2013). This lack of replication might be explained
by the following facts: Firstly, in the present study participants
were asked to report “the first moment of their finger move-
ment” rather than the time they pressed the button. Secondly,
participants were asked to gaze at the center of the clock and
refrain from eye-movement, i.e., they did not trace the clock-hand
movement. These two aspects have been demonstrated to sig-
nificantly affect the perceived time of the events in Libet-type
experiments (Pockett and Miller, 2007). Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to note that a much stronger effect-binding compared to
action-binding, as found here, has been consistently shown in
many other studies (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002; Moore et al., 2010,
2012; Strother et al., 2010; Aarts and van den Bos, 2011; Barlas
and Obhi, 2013; Yoshie and Haggard, 2013). One explanation of
this typical finding in intentional binding studies could be that
participants feel a stronger sense of agency when they are asked
to focus on the consequent effect rather than focusing on the
action.
Regarding the RP amplitude, we found that individuals who
showed a larger negative amplitude of the early RP had a higher
shift of reported time towards the action (effect-binding) in
the condition when participants needed to focus on the con-
sequent effect. Consistent with this result, the ongoing shifts
of the SCP within participants had a significant influence on
this type of reported time, with negative slopes of the early RP
being related to a larger shift towards action. Importantly, these
results were only found in the operant-T condition, demonstrat-
ing that the early neural activity prior to movement plays a
significant role in the consequent effect especially with respect
to the sense of agency. Since the early RP has been related
to activity in the pre-SMA (Shibasaki and Hallet, 2006), our
results showing that effect-binding is specific to the early RP,
but not the late RP, support the previous study by Moore
et al. (2010). They reported that the transient disruption of
pre-SMA using TMS showed a reduced effect-binding but not
a reduced action-binding. Notably, the disruption of contralat-
eral sensorimotor areas, which have been discussed as provid-
ing the source of the late RP, had no significant influence on
temporal binding. In other words, if the pre-SMA activity had
a facilitating effect, enhanced temporal attractions would be
expected as a result of increased effect-binding. Overall, the
present data represent the first direct evidence that the early RP
plays a crucial role in the temporal attraction contributing to the
effect-binding.
Notably, we found that trial-to-trial variability of the ongoing
shift of SCP determined the t-time even when the physical con-
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dition was held constant, i.e., within the operant-T task. While
ongoing brain fluctuation was shown to affect intrinsic motor
behavior (Fox et al., 2007; Jo et al., 2014) and the early RP
could reflect ongoing fluctuating SCPs (Schurger et al., 2012;
Jo et al., 2013), this observation raises the possibility that tem-
poral attraction occurs differently in dependence of the sta-
tus of spontaneous brain states. Additionally, one can assume
that preceding brain activity has a stronger influence on effect-
binding when the action is intrinsically generated rather than
triggered by external imperative stimuli. For instance, stronger
effect-binding was reported in the voluntary action condition
as compared to an involuntary action, though inducing the
belief of self-causation could modulate the effect-binding (Dogge
et al., 2012). There is strong evidence indicating that negative
deflections of the spontaneous fluctuating SCPs are associated
with an increasing probability of neural firing (Birbaumer et al.,
1990). Therefore an action is more likely to be executed during
negative shifts of the SCP. In line with this, it has repeatedly
been found that a conscious intention to act could arise more
likely during an ongoing negativity of the SCP, which on aver-
age results in an increased negative RP (Schurger et al., 2012;
Jo et al., 2013, 2014). Within this context, the present result
of the relation between the early RP and the t-time further
suggests that if a voluntary action follows an ongoing negative
potential of SCP it will more likely lead to temporal attraction
of the consequent effect than with positive deflections. That is,
the neural representation of conscious intention to act, ongoing
negative potentials of SCP, might be associated with an enhanced
sense of agency by predicting possible consequent effects of
action.
There is increasing evidence that the experience of agency is
generated by both predictive and postdictive processes (Synofzik
et al., 2013). Regarding predictive processes, the intentional motor
representation before an action is related to the experience of
agency for the given action. Regarding postdictive processes,
anticipation of an action’s outcome and the intention-outcome
matching play the crucial role for inferring self-agency (Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999). Although, many studies have repeatedly
found these both effects in intentional binding (Moore and Obhi,
2012), there is still ongoing debate on whether temporal attraction
is specific to intentional movement or a property of general
causality perception between action and outcome (Buehner and
Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012). For instance, causality percep-
tion between action- and outcome-synchronized auditory signals
modulated the intentional binding effect (Kawabe et al., 2013).
The current finding of the relation between temporal attraction
of the consequent effect and the early RP, but not with the late RP,
suggests that the emergence of intention to act affects intentional
binding.
In the baseline-T condition, we observed a slightly negative
amplitude. But since there is no action preceding the tone no
amplitude should be expected. A possible explanation could
be that participants might have anticipated the external event.
For instance, if participants learned the temporal expectancy of
events, expectancy-related CNV (contingent negative variation)
keeps rising until the time point of the expected event is reached
even when no motor preparation is involved (Mento et al., 2013).
Although the occurrence of the tones varies within an interval of
5 s, similar explanations can be applied to the result presented
in the baseline-T condition. It should be noted, though, that the
results of this task showed neither relation between event-related
EEG and t-time nor differences in t-time between negative and
positive epochs. Thereby one can conclude that the relation of
ongoing potential shifts to t-time during operant-T are not likely
due to temporal expectancy of the tone that is isolated from the
sense of agency.
Although EEG recordings allow the examination of neural cor-
relates with high temporal resolution, the temporal brain dynam-
ics underlying human agency is not well understood (David,
2012). Several studies have observed that the brain predicts the
sensory consequence of an action. The N1 amplitude was smaller
in predictive sensory outcome when it was self-generated as
compared to computer-generated feedback (Schafer and Marcus,
1973; Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Hughes et al., 2013).
Thus, N1 attenuation has been discussed as an indicator of
the forward sensory model that combines self-generated motor
commands and sensory information processes to predict sensory
outcome. The same mechanism seems to hold in the intentional
binding paradigm, as we observed sensory attenuation for the
tone-evoked N1 that was self-generated (operant-M and operant-
T) as compared to computer-generated (baseline-T; see Figure 2).
However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that event-related
EEG of the button press might affect the N1 amplitude.
One curious result of the present study is that the operant-
M condition showed a lower RP amplitude as compared to
the operant-T condition (p = 0.015), although both conditions
contain the same action and the same consequent effect but differ
in the reporting task. It can be speculated that in the different
conditions participants might have changed their subjective cri-
teria for performing a voluntary button press. Indeed, several
participants reported that they tried to disregard the tone effect
following their action in the operant-M condition. It could be that
the consequent tone after the button press was seen as distractor
since participants did not need to focus on it.
Regarding the group comparison, we found no differences
between mindfulness meditators and controls. Meditators and
controls showed the same temporal attraction in effect-binding
and no action-binding. With respect to event-related EEG, no
significant difference was found in the RP amplitudes for the
entire tasks. We also examined whether there was any ongoing
potential shift and early RP-related group differences, and found
no group effect. It is possible that the selection criteria were
not strong enough to recruit individuals who had sufficient
experiences of mindfulness meditation. Although the FMI scores
showed strong differences between groups, conceptual difficulties
in the meaning of “mindfulness” and also comprehension dis-
agreements of questionnaire items (Belzer et al., 2013) have led
to doubts of whether it is possible to assess the experience of
mindfulness through self-report items (Grossman, 2008). Thus,
the self-report measure might not differentiate between “levels” of
mindfulness but differences found here might describe different
levels of conceptual knowledge. Another possible explanation is
that meditators may have performed the task by focusing on their
perceived time rather than the actual event time. For instance,
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we observed earlier m-time in meditators than controls in both
baseline-M and operant-M conditions (see Table 1), though it
revealed no significant difference. It might be that meditators
reported the moment of “intention” to act, which is shortly before
the actual movement onset. Therefore, further work may concern
the possible divergences of subjective criteria, whether focusing
on perceived-events or actual events.
In conclusion, our results do not support the hypothesis that
mindfulness meditators would display different performance on
the intentional binding paradigm as compared to controls. How-
ever, the present findings of the early RP correlates with the tem-
poral attraction shed light on the underlying neural mechanism
of human agency. Our results suggest that the early neural activity
within the range of ongoing potential shifts affects the per-
ceived time of the sensory outcome that is caused by intentional
action.
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